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INTRODUCTION
As the eyes of the environmental community turned toMontreal last November in the expectation, or perhapsfaint hope, of a stronger Kyoto Protocol (“Protocol”)
capable of addressing climate change beyond 2012, the ques-
tion again arose as to whether a system with stronger econom-
ic enforcement mechanisms would be legally viable under the
current international economic system. Although the Protocol
has yet to conflict with the international rules of the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”), critics note that such disputes
may be inevitable.1
This article seeks to address one possible domestic step that
State Parties to the Kyoto Protocol may take to reduce emis-
sions, the additional measure which must be taken to address the
international competitiveness of the effected industries, and the
compatibility of these measures with WTO obligations. In par-
ticular, the article will address the use of a tax based on the
amount of carbon or energy used during the production process.
While such a tax may effectively reduce harmful emissions, it
will also increase costs for domestic industry, thereby reducing
international competitiveness. Therefore, governments may
seek to implement a border tax adjustment in order to maintain
the international competitiveness of domestic industry. Both
measures, however, present potential conflicts with the obliga-
tions of WTO members to maintain free and non-discriminato-
ry international trade. While the WTO case law regarding these
issues provides only minimal guidance, such conflicts will
inevitably be placed before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Body. The outcome of such conflicts will have enormous rami-
fications for national and international climate change policy. As
such, this article will focus on the challenges of implementing
an energy or carbon tax in light of WTO regulations, and will
argue that a multilateral tax agreement between Member States
may provide a more stable foundation for environmentally con-
scious measures implicating WTO obligations. 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND
THE WTO
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement on cli-
mate change, whereby industrialized nations and nations with
economies in transition (together called “Annex I” countries),
have agreed to reduce or restrict their greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions. Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol calls on Annex I
States to implement policies, including those concerned with tax
structures, which will address sustainable development and
GHG emissions.2 State Parties should implement such policies
in a manner which will minimize adverse effects on the econo-
my and international trade.3 The Protocol, therefore, addresses
both the reduction of GHG emissions and the sustained health
of the international economy. 
The WTO is an international economic organization com-
prised of 150 member governments that addresses trade rules
and disputes between member nations. The WTO is responsi-
ble for administering various trade agreements, including the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), a multi-
lateral agreement to encourage free trade among nations by
reducing trade barriers.
The Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the WTO calls
for an expansion of global trade “in accordance with the objective
of sustainable development” as well as the protection and preser-
vation of the environment.4 Despite this rhetorical recognition of
environmental objectives, such measures have consistently been
found to violate the principles of free and non-discriminatory
trade. Fundamentally, Article I of the GATT requires that any
trade opportunities extended to one Member State must be
extended to all Member States.5 This Most Favored Nation
(“MFN”) requirement governs the relationships between all
Member States. Article II of the GATT provides that parties have
the right to impose a charge on any product “from which the
imported product has been manufactured in whole or in part” if
the tax is consistent with other articles.6 Article III of the GATT,
or the national treatment provision, further requires that Member
States afford equal treatment to domestic and imported products.7
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Environmental regulations imposed by a Member State of
the WTO are often challenged under the MFN or national treat-
ment provisions.8 Article XX of the GATT provides exceptions
to these obligations by allowing for the implementation of
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health” or “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”9
WTO panels and Appellate Bodies have, however, interpreted
the General Exceptions of Article XX extremely narrowly and
have ruled that the great majority of domestic measures are not
acceptable under this Article.
ENERGY TAXES AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS:
THE HYPOTHETICAL EUROPEAN UNION
EXPERIENCE
THE HYPOTHETICAL MEASURE
The European Union, in an attempt to meet more stringent
post-Kyoto reductions that could not be achieved through less
controversial measures, implements a significant energy tax on
all domestic industries. The domestic tax is complemented by an
additional border tax, intended to protect the environmental
aims of the domestic tax on all products that are similarly pro-
duced in the EU and imported from industrial states.10
ENERGY TAXES AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS
GENERALLY
The implementation of an energy tax by the EU will facili-
tate emissions reductions by increasing the cost of energy need-
ed to manufacture products.11 Increased costs will result in
decreased competitiveness for European producers as they will
either internalize the costs or pass them on to consumers.12 These
producers will be effectively shut out from foreign markets, such
as the United States, where no such tax exists, and will be under-
cut in their home market by imported products.13 European pro-
ducers will thus have an incentive to employ more efficient prac-
tices that will, in turn, reduce the overall emission of GHGs. 
Numerous European countries currently employ energy or
carbon taxes that have greatly increased energy prices for
European countries in relation to the prices found in the United
States.14 These same countries, however, have exempted energy
intensive industries from these taxes in order to maintain inter-
national competitiveness.15 Although these exemptions thwart
domestic emissions reductions, price differentials in tax and
non-tax countries may result in an industry migration to non-tax
states with no actual emissions reductions.16
Such exemptions sacrifice the goals of these taxes and also
place higher costs on individual consumers instead of the large
producers which account for far greater proportions of emis-
sions.17 As Kyoto or post-Kyoto agreements become more strin-
gent, governments will inevitably revisit energy taxes as a nec-
essary means of emissions reductions. However, these govern-
ments will continue to face stiff opposition from domestic
industries and will be forced to develop measures that ensure the
competitiveness of these industries. 
BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS AS A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE
Border tax adjustments (“BTAs”) are one viable option for
implementation in conjunction with the hypothetical EU ener-
gy tax.18 A BTA attempts to rectify domestic price differentials
by taxing imported products at the same level as those pro-
duced domestically. In the event that these products are export-
ed, the tax placed on the products would be refunded to the pro-
ducer. The international economic community has sought to
address the issues raised by BTAs and formed a Working Party
on Border Tax Adjustments in 1968.19 The Working Party cre-
ated the following definition for BTAs, which has also been
adopted by the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment:20
[A]ny fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole
or in part, the destination principle (i.e. which enable
exported products to be relieved of some or all of the
taxed charged in the exporting country in respect of
similar domestic products sold to consumers on the
home market and which enable imported products sold
to consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax
charged in the importing country in respect of similar
domestic products).21
POSSIBLE ISSUES BETWEEN BTAS AND GATT
ARTICLES I, II, AND III 
The MFN and national treatment obligations of the WTO
represent two of the most litigated and fundamental hurdles for
any domestic measure affecting international trade. These hur-
dles would be seemingly sidestepped if the BTA was equally
applied both to imported products from all industrialized
Member States and to domestic and imported goods.
Unfortunately, the current interpretation of WTO obligations is
unclear as to whether such a tax is acceptable. 
As noted above, Article II concerns the rights of Member
States to impose internal taxes that satisfy the national treatment
requirement while targeting materials from which the imported
product was manufactured. However, this Article provides no
information as to whether nations may tax materials that are not
found in the final product, such as the energy or carbon con-
sumed during production.22 The 1970 Working Party on Border








but was unable to find a consensus on the acceptability of such
measures in terms of border tax adjustments.23
The case law regarding process-based taxes is similarly
murky and incomplete. In 1986, the United States implemented
a tax on certain chemicals used in the processing of other chem-
ical products.24 The Panel found that border taxes on imported
“like” products may take “chemicals used as materials in the
manufacturing or production of the imported substances” into
account.25 The Panel’s findings did not address the issue of
whether the chemicals used must be physically incorporated
into the final product or simply used to make the product, as is
the case for fuel and expended carbon.
The distinction between measures concerning products and
those concerning processes was further discussed in the
Tuna/Dolphin26 and Shrimp/Turtle cases.27 Although the meas-
ures at issue in these cases were process-based regulations and
not process-based taxes, the cases serve to establish the fairly
firm principle that processed-based regulations on trade are
prima facie violations of other WTO obligations. Commentators
have often noted that, while the Shrimp/Turtle decision may
have relaxed the prohibition on trade restrictive measures
founded on process standards,28 the product-process doctrine
has generally held firm for process regulations.29 However, the
WTO has never ruled on whether process-based taxes, such as
an energy tax, are also prima facie violations.30
POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING AN ENERGY
TAX AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT IN LIGHT OF
GATT OBLIGATIONS
In the event that process-based taxes are acceptable under
WTO obligations, the EU would inevitably be forced to defend
its measure against claims that the tax discriminates between
domestic and imported goods. For example, consider a situation
where EU producers of plastic containers are able to adopt pro-
duction methods that are less energy intensive. While such tech-
nology may initially result in higher costs for domestic produc-
ers, the costs will presumably decrease in the future as energy
efficient technology advances and becomes more available. In
such a scenario, U.S. producers of plastic containers using ener-
gy intensive methods would continue to be taxed according to
the energy used, regardless of the cost of production in the EU.
Although such a tax may not initially benefit domestic producers
of plastic containers because of the cost associated with adopting
new technology, EU producers may be able to bring cheaper
products to the market in the future. Therefore, while this energy
tax and BTA serve the climate change goals of the EU, it may,
however, also directly violate Article III of the GATT.
In the event that U.S. producers of plastic containers con-
vince the United States to file a claim with the WTO concerning
the BTA, the EU would be forced to defend the measure. The
BTA raises a number of complex issues that have not been clear-
ly decided. First, the EU must argue that plastic containers pro-
duced in an energy efficient manner are not sufficiently “like”
those which are produced in an energy intensive manner.
According to previous WTO decisions, the EU may find that dis-
tinguishing the products for the purposes of Article. III is difficult. 
In a case concerning French restrictions on cancer-causing
forms of asbestos, a WTO Appellate Body determined that
asbestos containing carcinogenic materials and asbestos that did
not containing such materials were not “like” products for the
purposes of Article III and could therefore be regulated different-
ly.31 The decision noted that differences in the physical character-
istics, end use, consumer preferences, and tariff classifications of
the products were important factors for determining “likeness.”
While EU consumers may show a significant preference for
energy efficient goods, the actual physical characteristics of
such goods will generally be the same. Therefore, the EU may
be forced to argue that, due to disparate processes through
which these goods are produced, they are not “like” products.
However, this argument again encounters the problematic prod-
uct-process doctrine. Given the current interpretation of WTO
law regarding this doctrine, it is unlikely that differences in pro-
duction methods would be sufficient to provide room for dis-
parate regulatory treatment.32
If, as expected, the WTO found that the EU BTA discrimi-
nates against imported goods, or that such process-based taxes
are not allowed under Articles II and III, the EU may still argue
that the tax is acceptable as an Article XX(g) exception. In doing
so, the EU must initially show that the measures are “primarily
aimed at” the “conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”33
Given the broad international recognition of climate change
issues as expressed in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), it is likely that
the EU would be able to satisfy the threshold requirements of an
Article XX exception.34 WTO jurisprudence has also estab-
lished three additional requirements for Article XX concerning
the discriminatory effects of a narrowly construed measure that
impacts trade.35 It is possible, however, that the EU measure
might be implemented in a manner that sufficiently minimizes
discrimination so as to satisfy Article. XX.
A finding that the EU’s energy tax and BTA are accepted
under Article XX will require the EU to establish a formal and
flexible process to provide for the potentially different circum-
stances in affected states. This is critical as the WTO is often
wary of domestic regulations that extend beyond the borders of
the implementing Member State.36
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Despite the current reluctance to acknowledge the legitima-
cy of environmental regulations under Article XX, the EU may
find a more receptive audience in a WTO Panel or Appellate
Body due to the international nature of climate change regula-
tions and the fact that the United States has previously recog-
nized the issue and signed the UNFCCC.37
CONCLUSION
Although the discussion above is useful in understanding the
current relationship between WTO and Kyoto obligations, the
larger question is whether the WTO is properly equipped to han-
dle such issues and whether Member States would be best served
by an EU victory in this hypothetical.38 The WTO is a body
charged with ensuring the stability and expansion of free trade
between Member States. Environmental regulations aimed at
stemming climate change will inevitably affect international eco-
nomic activity. While the WTO is firmly established and sup-
ported by the industrialized world, the issue of climate change
and the measures necessary to address it are highly charged and
controversial. Member States such as the United States and
China, both of whom are reluctant to implement domestic cli-
mate change measures, will vigorously resist the use of the WTO
to attain environmental objectives. Considering the current influ-
ence and significance of the U.S. economy, along with the fore-
casted clout of the Chinese economy, it will be difficult for the
WTO to evolve against the will of these states. In the worst-case
scenario, the current protectionist tendencies found on Capitol
Hill may find an ally in the industry executives who are unwill-
ing or unable to conform to climate-focused policies.39
Conversely, economic growth is, in large part, dependent on
environmental stability both because natural resources are vital
for all economies and because increased understanding of envi-
ronmental issues by consumers influences consumer choice.
The Kyoto Protocol represents an initial step by some Member
States to address climate change issues and the Protocol will
inevitably be followed by stronger action. If the WTO continues
to stifle domestic implementation of environmental measures
pursuant to international agreements, the WTO may find that
other important players in the Organization are unwilling to par-
ticipate in a purely economic organization. Such states may
demand the flexibility noted in the Kyoto Protocol to address
those issues mentioned in the WTO Charter. 
The WTO must actively pursue, through international
negotiations but not necessarily international consensus, an
understanding providing room for domestic action that does not
directly violate the MFN or national treatment obligations.
Energy taxes and companion BTAs will inevitably create certain
trade obstacles, such as higher costs or increased regulation, but
may be implemented in such a way as to impose these costs
equally on domestic and foreign producers. The current use of
the product-process distinction and the strict interpretation of
Article XX effectively prohibit the use of such measures that are
best suited to address climate change regardless of whether
implementation frustrates or advances the goals of the WTO.
Further, international negotiations will serve several impor-
tant functions. First, measures developed through such negotia-
tions are far more likely to satisfy the WTO’s consistent demand
for multilateral solutions to environmental issues.40 This multi-
lateral solution will also serve to harmonize process-based tax
systems.41 Without such harmonization, the proliferation of uni-
lateral action will effectively cripple the WTO by allowing
Member States to condition access to their markets on require-
ments that may differ from those in other Member States.42 A
multilateral agreement allowing for environmentally related
measures that do not establish discriminatory trade practices
will ensure both the stability of the WTO as well as the pursuit
of climate change policies. 
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